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Alfred E. Kahnt
The transformation of interexchange telecommunications from a regu-
lated, franchised monopoly to an unregulated, competitive industry has
been under way for a quarter century. AT&T now faces competition in
almost all of its intercity markets, including residential toll calling, and
the local operating companies face the prospect of partial displacement by
a number of emerging alternatives to the wired exchange network.1
It is probably a sign of good mental health that we seem to be spending
little time looking back and asking ourselves whether the course on which
we have embarked in telecommunications is the right one. The question, is
not only impossible to answer with any assurance, it is also irrelevant.
Further movement toward freer competition is inevitable, at least for the
foreseeable future." While I "estimate" a small but positive probability
that ten or twenty years from now we will look back and conclude that
the entire venture was a ghastly mistake,' I am convinced that this
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1. Prominent among these are direct links to large users via various combinations of microwave,
coaxial and fiberoptic cable, and satellite, provided either by the users themselves or other common
carriers.
2. Historically, rapid and dramatic technological advances, both in communications and the use of
communications, have made movement toward greater competitiveness inevitable. Once we had micro-
wave technology, which opened the door to private microwave systems, then the decision in Allocation
of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc. (Above 890) 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), modified, 29 F.C.C.
825 (1960) (allowing customers to construct and operate their own facilities for private, point-to-point
telecommunications, bypassing the telephone company network altogether), was probably inevitable.
Once we had private carriage, then "specialized" competitive common carriers followed. The activities
of these carriers were sanctioned in Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969),
reconsid. denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970) (permitting MCI to sell private line service in direct compe-
tition with the telephone company), and Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971),
afl'd sub nor. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 836 (1975) (competition in the private line market has no adverse technical or economic
effects on the telephone network and will only benefit consumers). And once those decisions were in
place, the competitive offering of general toll service became inevitable. This service received judicial
approval in MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC (Execunet I), 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S.. 1040 (1978), and MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC (Execunet II), 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (MCI can offer "Execunet" service, billing subscribers on a per call
basis, with minutes of use and distance called determining the charge, in addition to flat-rate private-
line service).
3. We may one day raise similar questions about the AT&T settlement, infra note 6, although I
doubt we will alter our present, apparently close to unanimous, approval of its having let AT&T out
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probability can be reduced substantially by the adoption of intelligent
pricing policies by telecommunications companies and their regulators.
I begin, in Section I, with a description of the features of an efficient
pricing system and of the inefficiencies of present pricing policies. Section
II :appraises various qualifications and reservations to the preceding argu-
rnent-some of them defensible, others that can be characterized only as
demagogic. Section III describes how recent developments in the courts
and at the FCC have already set in motion a transition to more efficient
pricing policies, which have in turn given rise, predictably, to political
resistance and efforts to hold back the clock. Sections IV and V deal, re-
spectively, with possible solutions to the practical and political obstacles
that companies and regulators will undoubtedly encounter, indeed them-
selves construct, as the transition proceeds.
I. The Inefficiency of Present Pricing Policies
A. Features of an Efficient Pricing System
Economic efficiency requires that services be priced at their marginal
costs.' A telecommunications system incurs two types of costs. The first
are the costs associated with merely connecting a customer to the network;
because they are not affected by how much he then uses the system, they
are characterized as non-traffic-sensitive. 5 Traffic-sensitive costs, in con-
trast, are generated by the customer's usage of the system and vary with,
among other factors, the time and duration of usage, the distance traversed
by the call, and whether the call is intra- or interexchange.'
of the 1956 consent decree. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246
(D.N.J. 1956) (imposing constraints on AT&T's retailing of data processing services and requiring
AT&T to license its patents to Bell Laboratories' competitors). For the rest, this much is clear:
Whatever new problems it has created, the AT&T settlement has burst through a horrendous collec-
tion of roadblocks. It forces us to get on with the job of devising a new, economically more rational set
of communications policies, and from that standpoint it has been unequivocally beneficial. In conjunc-
tion with the FCC's deregulation, the basic structural change it effected (the separation of the local
telephone companies from the interexchange operations) and its requirement of cost-based, non-
discriminatory access charges force us to deal explicitly with the industry's present, irrational pricing
policies-policies that could be perpetuated under tight regulatory cartelization but cannot survive
under deregulated competition. See infra text accompanying notes 33-40.
4. E.g., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 435-36 (11th ed. 1980).
5. Recently, some witnesses before state regulatory commissions have proffered demonstrations
that for various, largely historical reasons the costs of subscriber access systems do vary-or have
varied-positively with usage. See especially the testimony of Dr. John W. Wilson before the Mis-
souri Public Service Commission, Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. Case Nos. TR-83-253/TR-83-288
(1983). It is impossible to do justice to the controversies over these assertions, except to observe that
they are controverted by telephone company engineers. Moreover, they rest primarily on assertions
about the ways in which costs that are now sunk were incurred in the past rather than about margi-
nal costs, which are entirely forward-looking. See my rebuttal of Wilson, id.
6. "Interexchange telecommunication" means telecommunication between a point located in one
exchange area and a point or points located in a different exchange area. "Intraexchange telecommu-
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Assuming metering costs are not prohibitive, an efficient telecommuni-
cations pricing system would therefore charge each user a two-part tariff.
One part would be a fixed access charge (levied either as a lump-sum or
on a periodic basis), which would cover only the marginal non-traffic-
sensitive costs of connecting the customer with the existing system. Such a
charge would vary substantially among customers depending on their lo-
cations and on other factors that may cause those costs to differ. The sec-
ond part of the tariff, related to traffic-sensitive costs, would vary with the
customer's usage of the network and would reflect the mix and duration of
intra- and interexchange calls and the times the calls were made.'
B. Present Deviations from Efficiency
A comparison of present telecommunications pricing policies with the
foregoing principles uncovers three major sources of inefficiency.
First, both access and usage rates are in large measure averaged over a
number of subscribers. They therefore do not reflect individual geo-
graphic, temporal, or other factors that cause true access costs to vary
among customers. (Consider, for example, the difference between the mar-
ginal costs of plugging in a phone for a new resident in an existing urban
apartment and of extending telephone lines and inside wiring to a newly-
built, isolated rural home.) Nor do local or long-distance rates reflect the
very large differences in the usage-sensitive costs of calls between persons
in different locations.
Second, a large portion of the costs of providing access to the telephone
network is recovered in charges for using the system, even though those
costs are largely independent of usage. Customers impose access costs on
the system when they are connected to it, regardless of whether they then
proceed to place or to receive calls.8 Because it ignores this fact, the pre-
sent pricing practice has two adverse consequences, each the counterpart
of the other. On the one hand, the basic monthly service charge is far too
low. People are thus encouraged to become customers and, even more
flagrantly undesirable, to order additional lines, when the value to them of
that access is less than the cost to society of providing it. On the other
hand, the charges for using the long-distance network are artificially in-
flated (on the order of sixty percent)o because customers are required, by
nication" means telecommunications between two points located within the same exchange area. See
United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 229 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal dismissed, United States
v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
7. The argument for time of day charging is that usage during peak hours requires marginal
additions to network capacity, whereas usage at other times does not.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
9. See Johnson, Why Local Rates are Rising, REGULATION, Jul.-Aug. 1983, at 31, 33.
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the "separations and settlements" process currently followed by the FCC
and local regulators, 0 to contribute to the payment of costs that would not
be avoided even if their long-distance calling were curtailed. The result is
very inefficient-the artificial sixty percent tax discourages people from
making long-distance calls by grossly exaggerating the costs they impose
on society when they do so." This source of inefficiency is especially seri-
ous since the demand for interexchange calling is more sensitive to price
than the demands for other services.12 The efficiency -is almost certainly
understated by the sixty percent figure as well, since that figure represents
the markup, above average costs, or average revenue requirements as set
by traditional regulatory procedures. Marginal costs, to which economi-
cally efficient prices would have to be equated, appear to be far below,
average.
Some state regulators are being presented with testimony purporting to
demonstrate that revenues from local service cover its fully 'distributed
costs and that the asserted subsidy of local charges is therefore a fraud."3
In economic terms (and I cannot think what other terms are relevant)
those demonstrations are nonsense. They rely on the economically false
proposition, legally approved by Smith v. Illinois Bell, 4 that interstate
usage should bear some part of the non-traffic-sensitive costs of providing
subscribers access to the local exchange.' 5 Only by allocating some portion
of those costs to iriterstate usage do these studies "demonstrate" that the
basic charge for local service fully covers the "cost" of providing this ser-
vice. Once one accepts, instead, the economically incontestable proposi-
10. "Separations and settlements" is the process by which investments and expenses of telephone
companies are allocated between the interstate and intrastate jurisdictions and, similarly, between
intrastate toll calling and local exchange rates. Such allocations provide a mechanism by which reve-
nue requirements for interstate and intrastate operations are developed. The present system of "sepa-
rations and settlements" employed by the FCC is the so-called "Ozark" plan adopted in 1970, Sepa-
rations Procedures, 26 F.C.C.2d 247 (Report and Order), which has periodically been reviewed and
amended. See Separations Procedures, 80 F.C.C.2d 230 (1980).
11. Even if, as some are now contending, see supra note 5, these subscriber access costs did vary
with usage, that would still fall far short of justifying the present system, which imposes these costs so
disproportionately on the one-seventh of usage that is interexchange while most local calling is
charged a zero marginal price. In the minority of cases in which measured local service is provided,
local calling is often similarly burdened with charges per message markedly higher than marginal
cost, in order to hold down the flat monthly charge.
12. See L. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE 80, 170 (1980).
13. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. John W. Wilson, In re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., Mont.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket 82.2.8 (1982).
14. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930) (suit by public utility to enjoin as confis-
catory a state commerce commission order lowering rates for intrastate telephone service, holding that,
in determining apportionment of costs betweeen intra- and interstate service, it is improper to ignore
the fact that part of the use of a local telephone company's property is in the transmission and recep-
tion of interstate messages).
15. Id. at 150-51. See supra note 5 for a reference to a later shift in this argument from the
positioti that non-traffic-sensitive costs should be imposed on usage to a contention that a large part of
what the telephone companies have been classifying as access costsare really traffic-sensitive.
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tions that costs that do not vary with usage should not be recovered in
charges for usage 6 and that there is no such separate service or phenome-
non as access to the interexchange (as distinguished from the local) net-
work," one recognizes inescapably-again, as a matter of econom-
ics-that imposition of any of those costs on usage constitutes an improper
subsidy. 8
The third source of inefficiency is that typical local rates do not take
into account the amount of local usage or, more importantly, the amount
of usage at busy hours." Since additional local calling, at least at busy
hours, requires extra capacity, the general practice of providing service on
a flat rate basis-with no charge per call or per minute-results in exces-
sive local calling. That is, it leads people to place calls the value of which
to them is less than the costs those calls impose on society.
C. Inefficient Pricing as the Instrument of Cross-Subsidization
These inefficient pricing practices are the consequence and instrument
of a complex network of cross-subsidies between different customer
groups. First, long-distance service under the present system grossly subsi-
dizes local service. A customer placing a long-distance call incurs a charge
per call and per minute far greater than the additional cost to society of
each call or minute, while a customer placing a local call in most areas
pays nothing per call or minute, which of course is less than the addi-
tional cost to society. Moreover, the subsidy is very large-about $7 bil-
16. See. supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
17. In practice, a customer must use both. the local network and interexchange facilities to com-
plete a long-distance call. There is no practicable way for a telephone company to provide access to
the one and not the other. Any access is automatically access to the entire system.
'18. This is not to deny that under certain "second-best" conditions, some such cross-subsidy may
be economically desirable. See infra text accompanying notes 22-29. 1 am aware of no demonstration,
however, that would justify anything remotely approximating the present level of subsidy.
Nor do I suggest that there may not be other ways, under the present charging system, in which
local service charges recover some costs properly chargeable to interstate usage or to "vertical" ser-
vices, or may do so in the future, depending on the terms on which assets were transferred between
the Bell operating companies and the other portions of AT&T from which they have been separated.
For example, the license contract fee, hitherto incorporated in intrastate revenue requirements, un-
doubtedly helped finance research and development of, sophisticated terminal equipment that will
henceforth be sold by the successor parent company. The AT&T settlement requires AT&T to ac-
count for benefits such as these, with a view to compensating the operating companies for them, in
order to avoid or undo any such possibly unjustified burden on the basic monthly local charge. See
United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 177.
19. Some local telephone companies do use metered service in some markets. New York Tele-
phone uses time-of-day charges while Southern New England Telephone offers an economy telephone
service, "Select-a-Call," under which the customer is charged a low monthly rate for simple access
and low per call charges, discounted nights and weekends, for all outgoing calls. But these offerings
are typically optional to residential customers, the overwhelming majority of whom take flat rate
services, at a heavily subsidized flat monthly charge.
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lion20 in 1981 from interstate toll calls (with a few billion more from
intrastate toll calls), which amounts to an average of $7 per month for
every telephone line in the country and, at the extreme, $27 per month in
Nevada. 1
Second, because businesses do a disproportionately large amount of
long-distance calling, business subscribers in the first instance subsidize
residential subscribers. Since businesses generally survive by passing their
costs on in their prices, however, this means in the final instance that
residential telephone service is subsidized by a kind of sales tax on all the
purchasers of goods and services produced by businesses that are
overcharged for their telephone service.
Third, geographically accessible customers subsidize inaccessible cus-
tomers. This is generally a subsidy from urban to rural customers and
encourages an uneconomically high proportion of the public to connect to
the network or to demand single-party rather than multi-party service.
Fourth, customers with a preference for making local calls during off-
peak hours subsidize those with a preference for peak hours.
A pricing system based on marginal costs would correct these inefficien-
cies. Other considerations, however, seem to argue for a departure from
marginal cost pricing. These are the subject of the next section.
I. Some Qualifications and Counter-Considerations, Rational and
Demagogic
There are two valid qualifications to the proposition of the previous
section that all marginal access costs should be recovered in the basic
monthly charge. First, subscribers benefit from being able to reach other
subscribers; if some drop off the system in response to cost-based access
charges, this will reduce the value of the service to those who retain it.
Second, various other social or political considerations might call for sub-
sidization of access for certain groups, such as the poor.
A. External Benefits
The first of these qualifications-the external benefits that one sub-
scriber confers on others-could in principle justify making heavy users,
who presumably get the most benefit from the system, subsidize the basic
access charge so that they can continue to reach those who would other-
20. MTS and WATS Market Structure, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,319, 10,321 (1983) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt. 69).
21. MTS and WATS Market Structure, Comments of the Bell Operating Companies and AT&T
in Response to the Fourth Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 20-21, FCC
Docket 78-72 (August 6, 1982).
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wise drop off the network. 2
Since this consideration is a familiar one, I confine myself to two obser-
vations about it. First, the argument can easily be overdone. It is difficult
to measure the size of the externality, and it is not at all clear to what
extent heavy users are interested in reaching all who would decide not to
have service if it were priced at its full cost. Second, providing a univer-
sally subsidized basic access charge is an excessively imprecise and ineffi-
cient way of preserving the external benefit. The particular heavy users
who are especially interested in being able to reach and be reached by
particular customers who would otherwise drop service-impecunious rel-
atives, for example-could be expected to help pay those bills directly,
without forcing the burden on others who would reap little or none of the
benefit.
B. Preserving Service for the Poor
The second qualification is that there may be a broad social consensus
that we ought to do something about people who would be excluded by
purely cost-based prices from enjoying what we have come to regard as a
necessary component of the minimum acceptable standard of living, and
that we ought to do so without resorting to the economically superior
method of direct government subsidy. This consideration is on the one
hand so familiar and on the other so frequently abused that I consider it
more important to refute the demagogic contentions with which it is all
too frequently associated than to discuss the qualification itself-other
than to observe that there are far less costly and inefficient ways of achiev-
ing this goal than simply rejecting economically efficient pricing.
The vulgar arguments to which I refer are such contentions as that the
dictates of economic efficiency are in flat conflict with principles of equity,
or that shifting more costs to the monthly charge is bad for "consumers"
and must therefore be opposed by all who profess to speak for them.28
Clearly there are possible areas of public policy in which conceptions of
fairness may conflict with economic efficiency. But the major departures
from economic efficiency in today's public policies are also demonstrably
unfair,"' and movement in the direction of economic efficiency is compati-
22. Griffin, The Welfare Implications of Externalities and Price Elasticities for Telecommunica-
tions Pricing, 64 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 59-66 (1982).
23. See, e.g., The Economics of Telephone Service From The Consumer Perspective: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture and Transportation of the Joint Economic Committee, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 3, 1983) (testimony of Lee Richardson, Vice President, Consumer Federation of
America).
24. The following examples come to mind: farm parity price supports, the benefits of which go
primarily to wealthy farmers; unlimited deduction of mortgage interest and property taxes, the bene-
fits of which go primarily to the wealthy; and quota restrictions on imports of Japanese cars and steel,
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ble with increased fairness. It is fair, as a general proposition, to impose
costs on people when and to the extent they impose costs on society.
The "consumer," moreover, is not a single entity but a collection of
diverse individuals, with varying patterns of behavior and needs. The
proper pricing of communications services requires that we determine how
best to distribute a given burden of costs so as to maximize the flow of
benefits net of costs for all consumers. For example, there are consumers
who make local calls infrequently, or, when they make them, make them
off peak or briefly; and there are others who make local calls all the time,
often on peak, and talk without limit. Therefore, to oppose local metered
service-as some consumer advocates do-on the ground of equity or of
"protecting the consumer" is simple demagoguery. There are consumers
who want to make a lot of calls in an extended area at no extra charge,
and there are others who happen to live in the country, or on the borders
of local calling areas, whose equally short-distance calls are subject to in-
flated toll rates. It is ridiculous to imply that the interests of both of these
would be similarly, and adversely, affected by a more efficient pricing
system.
Similarly, there is a difference between the consumer who uses direc-
tory assistance all the time and the one who takes the trouble to look up
numbers in the phone book. To oppose charging for directory assistance
on the ground of "protecting the consumer," as many have, is to make an
argument unworthy of respect. It is not unfair to consumers, who have to
bear all the costs in any case, to distinguish among them on the basis of
the costs they impose on society.
And it is a reflection at best of ignorance-and at worst of demagogu-
ery-to advocate holding down direct charges to individual purchasers by
shifting costs to businesses, in the supposed interest of "the consumer."
The business of businesses consists largely in shifting their costs to their
customers, and it is the simplest and least contestable. of. economic proposi-
tions that consumers in the aggregate are better .off paying prices that
reflect directly the marginal costs of the various goods and services among
which they choose.
Returning to the second qualification, how can economic efficiency ac-
commodate our desire to keep telephone service affordable to poor people?
The task of social policy is to identify the people that we agree we would
like to help, and then to find a method of helping them in a way that
imposes the minimum cost on all of us-which includes them. Our ten-
dency to try to help "consumers" by holding all prices down ends up in-
juring almost everybody. If we are to retain a subsidy for basic service, it
which protect the salaries of highly paid auto and steel workers.
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has to be less negligently and haphazardly distributed and more tightly
targeted at those who really need it."
Because of the way costs are actually incurred in providing access, it is
also possible that a commitment to efficient, marginal cost pricing may
itself produce a partial solution to the problem of providing access for the
poor. The reason is that the bulk of non-traffic-sensitive costs, which the
telephone companies are entitled to recover from their customers, is com-
posed of carrying charges on the huge sunk investment in access facilities.
That is to say, the average cost of access consists largely in historical,
"embedded" costs of providing access to existing structures. Marginal
costs, in contrast, look only to the future; they measure only the additional
cost of connecting a given (new or old) structure to the network-the cost
(and only the cost) that would be saved by someone deciding not to be-
come or continue to be a subscriber.
This difference between average revenue requirements and marginal
costs might hold the clue to a partial reconciliation of the demands of
economic efficiency with the insulation of poor subscribers from sharp in-
creases in their monthly bills. For those premises and service areas that
already have inside wiring and access lines to the central exchange, whose
costs are largely Sunk and perhaps unrecoverable by salvage, the marginal
cost of providing access could consist only in the cost of actual connection
and current maintenance." For new developments, in contrast, the margi-
nal cost of providing genuinely new access is likely to be much higher.
Customers in new developments can and should bear the higher costs they
impose on the system; those in old developments (which presumably in-
clude most of the poor) might through de-averaging be spared those costs
and therefore be less inclined to discontinue service.
To understand why this distinction between customers in old and new
developments is in principle sound (however large or small the differences
in their marginal costs actually prove to be), we may contrast it with the
argument of many electric utility companies and some "consumer advo-
cates" that new customers should pay higher electric rates than existing
customers because they are responsible for the high "marginal costs" of
25. We might, for example, issue "telephone stamps," analogous to food stamps, to those deter-
mined to be in genuine financial need. See also H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 234 (1982) (propo-
sal for National Telecommunications Fund).
26. The reason this cannot, without further study, be characterized as more than a possibility is
that the marginal cost of any subscriber's remaining attached to the network includes the opportunity
cost of providing him access-the possibility that the facilities now serving him would otherwise be
released to serve someone else and the telephone company spared the new investment in additional
facilities to attach the new customer. One can therefore be certain that the marginal hook-up costs for
existing customers in existing structures are below current costs only where, if those customers
dropped service, the facilities would be unused and the sunk investment in them stranded.
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additional capacity. In the case of electric generating costs, that argument
is nonsense. The demands of new and old customers for generated electric
power are economically indistinguishable so far as their marginal cost re-
sponsibility is concerned; the need to build costly new generating plants
would be reduced just as much if existing customers conserved as if new
customers did not join the system. Economic efficiency therefore requires
that every kilowatt hour demanded be confronted with the same marginal
cost. Electric distribution costs, in contrast, are geographically specific to
particular categories of customers. So with telephone access costs: Levying
the same access charges on new and old customers-when and if the mar-
ginal costs of attaching them differ substantially-subsidizes new, higher
cost subscribers at the expense of existing ones.
The logic of this distinction, as a matter of both economics and equity,
is the same as underlay the recent decision by the FCC that the costs of
connections, installations, and moves should be expensed and charged di-
rectly to the customers responsible rather than capitalized and thereby
charged to everybody.2" There is no reason why people who do not move
should subsidize people who do. Likewise, there is no reason why people
being served in existing service areas, by existing drop lines, should subsi-
dize people whose access requires the system to incur high costs-except
to the extent that discontinuing service by the former would free up r'acili-
ties that could be used to serve the latter.
There may, therefore, be some justification, even in terms of economic
efficiency, for providing a low-priced, lifeline service to existing
customers-involving low access charges and separate charges for each
cal1 28-as a means of minimizing the burden on poor people and the sur-
render of service, while also minimizing the inefficient discouragement of
usage.
III. Recent Movement Toward Efficiency, and Political
Countermovements
By separating local exchange from interexchange operations, the
AT&T settlement" gives local Bell Operating Companies (BOC's) re-
sponsibility for imposing charges covering the non-traffic-sensitive costs of
access, as well as the traffic-sensitive costs that interexchange service
causes them to incur.3" This makes sense, because it is they who provide
27. Uniform Sys. of Accounts, 85 F.C.C. 2d 818 (1981).
28. Another "lifeline" service-practicable in some areas that still offer multi-party ser-
vice-might be a four- or eight-party line.
29. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 131.
30. Id. at 232.
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the facilities and incur those costs. By placing on the BOC's the burden of
imposing access charges based on their individual costs, the settlement
clearly encourages de-averaging across operating companies and across
state lines-which is also the direction economic efficiency dictates. There
will undoubtedly have to be a substantial amount of residual averaging in
order to avoid intolerably abrupt rate increases in high-cost areas that are
heavily subsidized under the present system,31 but the only way to elimi-
nate the disincentives to efficiency inherent in the present system of "sepa-
rations and settlements"82 is to move toward de-averaging as quickly as
possible. The ultimate goal ought to be a situation in which each carrier
sets its own exchange access charges, on the basis of its own costs, to its
own customers.
The settlement also strengthens the case for the "Pure II" approach
considered and essentially adopted by the FCC in Docket 78-72," 3 which
over a five to seven year period would have levied directly on subscribers,
in a lump sum monthly charge,84 the entire portion of non-traffic-sensitive
access costs currently allocated to the interstate jurisdiction via "separa-
tions." Since the BOC's will be responsible for recovering all of their ex-
change access costs from their customers, who alone cause those costs to be
incurred, the BOC's are less likely to suffer from the illusion that they can
extract the dollars from some external "interstate" entity, and correspond-
ingly more likely to collect them from people as they impose costs on the
system.
Of course, the BOC's will probably want to continue to levy some part
of the non-traffic-sensitive costs on AT&T and the other interexchange
(long-distance) common carriers, necessarily on the basis of usage, in or-
der to hold down the requisite increases in the basic monthly charge.
They certainly will be pressed to do so by the regulatory commissions-to
the point, there is reason to fear, of imperiling the financial viability of the
BOC's. But because they and the state commissions are the ones that will
now be responsible for recovering these costs, they will no longer be able
to ignore the consequences of attempting to recover too much of them out
of long-distance charges. They will see when and where charges that are
too high induce a bypass of their facilities and consequent loss of reve-
nues,3 5 causing injury to themselves and to the consumers whom it is their
responsibility to protect.
31. See supra text accompanying note 20.
32. See supra note 10.
33. MTS and WATS Market Structure, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,319 (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
pt. 69).
34. Id. at 10,330.
35. See supra note 1. See also United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 175.
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Under the new arrangement created by the settlement, the local compa-
nies and regulators also will be in a position to vary the recovery of non-
traffic-sensitive costs between flat access charges and rates related to long-
distance usage, depending upon local market conditions. 6 They will have
to decide, from market to market, how long these costs can be recovered
out of long-distance charges, and therefore how quickly they must begin
recovering them entirely from the flat monthly charge.
Moreover, as the decision affirming the settlement suggested, 7 there
may be an encouraging inverse relationship between competitive necessity
and the size and painfulness of the required change: In rural areas, where
access costs tend to be high, bypass possibilities are slight and the transi-
tion can therefore be longer, with a relatively low, subsidized access
charge and a relatively high recovery of non-traffic-sensitive costs from
long-distance usage. In cities, by contrast, where the cost of providing ac-
cess generally is lower but the bypass possibilities much greater (because
of concentrated traffic), the transition must be more rapid, but it probably
will be less painful. Where heavy long-distance users can more readily
escape the burden of non-traffic-sensitive costs, it is more urgent to recover
such costs out of the flat charge, but it will be politically easier to do so
because there is less difference between the current monthly charge and
the "true" costs of access."
Whatever the possibilities of mitigating the pains of the move toward
more efficient pricing compelled by the introduction of competition, there
is no doubt the pains will be intense, and the political resistance even
more so. No regulator will be happy having to raise the monthly charge.
Indeed, the success of state regulators over the last twenty-five years in
imposing an ever larger proportion of the non-traffic-sensitive costs of ac-
cess upon long-distance usage 9 has widened the inefficiency gap and, cor-
respondingly, aggravated the political problems of closing it. Ironically,
this occurred during the very period when the national policy of opening
long-distance telephone service to competition was bringing closer the day
when such gross subsidizations could no longer be sustained.
Recent events graphically illustrate these political obstacles. Since the
36. 552 F. Supp. at 169.
37. Id. at 175.
38. 1 have surely oversimplified. On the one hand, the costs of providing and maintaining ex-
change access may be very high in some very dense center cities, where the dangers of bypass by large
users are also great. On the other, I owe to Walter Hinchman the suggestion that moving to the Pure
11 approach in rural areas may be easier than commonly supposed, because rural customers, precisely
because of their comparative isolation, are disproportionately burdened with inflated toll charges,
which would come down as the basic monthly charge went up.
39. See MacAvoy & Robinson, Winning by Losing: The AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on
Telecommunications, I YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2-9 (1983).
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FCC announced its sensible position in Docket 78-72, in December of
1982, the regulatory and legislative resistances have mounted. The judge
superintending the AT&T settlement has expressed his outrage at the
FCC's failure to perpetuate the old system of imposing non-traffic-
sensitive costs on the long-distance caller,4 thereby threatening (quite un-
justly) to write his name in the history books as the man responsible for
doubling the basic telephone charge. A Congressional effort to turn back
the clock has gathered momentum.4' The FCC itself has felt compelled to
modify and delay its original plans,4 and the final outcome is difficult to
predict. The one thing that is certain is that the new regime of competi-
tion, on the one hand, and perpetuation of the old regime of inefficient
pricing, on the other, are fundamentally incompatible; one or the other is
going to have to give. In the following section, I consider two possible
ways of easing the transition, corresponding to the two horns of the di-
lemma confronting the telephone companies and their regulators.
IV. The Transition to More Efficient Pricing
A. The Case for Gradualness
The more visible horn of the dilemma is the painfulness of the ines-
capable increase in the basic monthly charge. The most obvious palliative
is to spread the increase out over time. Another measure, even more im-
portant in the longer run, is to offer subscribers a wider range of price
and service options than is currently available. Elaboration of the latter
idea is reserved for Section V.
Allowing for a gradual, but not too gradual, transition to efficient pric-
ing can serve a valuable economic as well as political purpose in two
ways, provided the end result is clearly announced. First, it may serve as a
justification for avoiding uneconomic upgrading of service. I recently
heard a regulatory commissioner from a sparsely populated western state
complain of the public pressures his local phone company was under from
rural customers to go from four-party to one-party service, knowing full
well that he could not hope to permit the company to charge the estimated
cost of $30 a month. An announcement that the costs of that superior
access must eventually be added to the basic charge might help relieve
40. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 990, 998-1000 (D.D.C. 1983) (H.
Greene, J.).
41. See H.R. 4102, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3621, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 607,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1660, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (all dealing with repeal of parts of
FCC order imposing "access" fees on the telephone bills of consumers and small businesses).
42. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, 48 Fed. Reg. 42,984 (1983) (to be codifed at 47
C.F.R. pt. 69); Phone Access Fee Delayed Until '85, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
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those pressures.
Second, a gradual transition would give alternative technologies better
adapted to serving high-cost customers an opportunity to be introduced or
developed, whether by the phone companies themselves or others."3 The
rationalization of rates offers hope for technical solutions to the problem
of providing quality service to high-cost areas, the development of which is
discouraged by the present cross-subsidized rates. Could it be, for exam-
ple, that announcement of scheduled increases of local rates in rural areas
would make radio telephony over those long, sparse routes economic?
B. The Case for Quantity Discounts
The other horn of the dilemma, of course, is that any transitional ar-
rangement that leaves a portion of the non-traffic-sensitive costs to be re-
covered out of long-distance charges will encourage bypass of local net-
works, a danger already magnified by the recent intensification of
competition and the progress of technology."" Such bypass would be unec-
onomic because it would result from the excess of current rates over mar-
ginal cost. The telephone companies will have to propose, and regulators
consider, a variety of ways of minimizing this danger. Since the possibility
of bypass grows with the individual subscriber's use of the network, an
important component of the interim rate structures will probably have to
be some sort of "taper," a declining rate for incremental usage that will
provide a progressive quantity discount. Such a rate structure could be
patterned on the familiar declining block rates for electricity,' 5 which had
the same historical justification.
The economic case for the taper, in these circumstances, is unexception-
able. Marginal costs are now below average revenue requirements, and
rates set at the latter level are resulting in an economically unjustified loss
of customers. The rates for successive blocks of usage must not, of course,
decline below marginal cost. True, such a discount will help the big users
disproportionately; but if big users have an escape from economically ex-
cessive charges, a BOC will have no choice but to reduce rates to them if
they are to make any contribution to the access costs which the small users
would otherwise have to pay by themselves. The taper is clearly needed in
these circumstances, then, in the interest of both economic efficiency and
minimizing the danger that small users or impecunious subscribers will
43. Such alternative technologies might include, among others, high-speed, wide-band multipoint
distribution facilities, direct broadcast satellite services or mobile radio.
44. See supra note 1.
45. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 306-16 (1961); E. BER-
LIN, C. CICCHETTI & W. GILLEN, PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 16 (1974) (discussing declining block
rates).
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drop off the system.
Quantity discounts are not the only rate innovation needed for the tran-
sition. The BOC's may need permission to respond to threatened losses of
large customers on an individual basis as well, for example, by negotiating
long-term contractual rates, just as the railroads were at last permitted to
do by the Staggers Act of 1980.46 This might be the only way of giving
them sufficient flexibility to meet the threat of new competition engen-
dered by the inefficient rate structures to which they will be held during
the transition.
How long the transition ought to be or, given political considerations,
will have to be, I do not know. How long the residual subsidy will remain
and how large it will be, say, five years from now, I do not know.
Whether it can ever be totally terminated, I do not know. I am certain,
however, that the subsidy can be drastically and safely reduced without
impairing our present near universality of service, merely by directing it
more precisely to the people who need it most, and that it can be financed
more efficiently than it is financed today. The new regime of competition
compels it; economic efficiency, which our country badly needs, requires
it; equity demands it.
V. Overcoming Political Obstacles
Progress toward more efficient pricing policies has already met with
formidable political resistance.4 However much they may be required for
economic efficiency, justified by the non-traffic-sensitivity of access costs
and compelled by the pressures of competition, increases in the basic
monthly rate are political poison. They will be even more difficult to bear
because they will be magnified in the short run by other consequences of
intensified competition and technological change, notably the required in-
crease in depreciation rates."' A further impediment to any rational solu-
tion is the widespread popular belief that if something is regulated it can
defy the principles of economics. The same people who are willing to pay
$15-425 per month for cable TV, Home Box Office, and the like seem to
regard a $6-410 rate for unlimited local calling as a God-given right. And
people buying a newly built $70,000 house regard it as heinous if they are
required to pay the $150 or more that it costs to put a telephone in it.
There are no miraculous solutions to these political obstacles, yet there
are ways of circumventing or confronting them. And, because technology
46. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 49 U.S.C. § 10,701a (Supp. V 1981).
47. See supra note 42.
48. In re Proceedings to Allocate Depreciation Reserve, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,952 (Oct. 16, 1981) (to
be codified at 47 CFR pt. 31).
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and economics are powerful allies, there is reason to anticipate at least
partial success. The following are seven suggestions for overcoming these
obstacles.
One politically helpful course was the one the FCC attempted to adopt
when it assumed responsibility for part of the rate increase in the form of
a separate charge for "interexchange access."' That decision, had Con-
gress permitted it to take effect, would have made the job of state regula-
tors easier by taking this unpleasant task out of their hands. One advan-
tage of the federal system is that it may make it possible to do some
necessary but distasteful things at the national level that would be politi-
cally impossible to do locally. Unfortunately, the resistance in Congress
proved so strong that the FCC delayed this action as to residential and
small business subscribers, at leastuntil after the 1984 election.5"
Second, we must patiently explain to the courts and the public at large
the fallaciousness of the widely held opinion that if you use some facility
and get some benefit from it, it is only fair that you pay some share of its
cost, even though your using it imposes no sacrifice on anyone. 1 Anyone
who has argued in a public forum the merits of peak responsibility pricing
will recognize how profoundly held that view is.52 I fear it is the underly-
ing rationale of Smith v. Illinois Bell."3
For its attempt to reconcile popular opinion and Smith v. Illinois Bell
on the one side, with economic reality on the other, by imposing a lump
sum charge for "interstate access," the FCC surely deserves an A for ef-
fort and ingenuity. Unfortunately its proposed solution invites the re-
sponse: "I don't want interstate access. I don't make any long-distance
calls, so why should I have to pay' for it?" And to the counter-argument
that there is no way of choosing to have or not to have interstate access
apart from local access, the rejoinder: "If there is no such thing as inter-
state access, how come you're proposing to charge for it?" In short, I fear
that this attempt to satisfy Smith v. Illinois Bell while nevertheless remov-
ing the tax on usage may be unsuccessful.
I suspect, therefore, that it will eventually be necessary to expose as
false the notion that "interstate" is some identifiable entity onto which
"local" consumers can shift some of the costs of the system. What we must
clearly explain is that only real people, "local" people, pay the costs of
49. MTS and WATS Market Structure, supra note 42.
50. Phone Access Fee Delayed Until '85, supra note 42.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.
52. 1 recently had a pleasant conversation with the owner of a trucking company that has pros-
pered under deregulation. He expressed enthusiasm for that reform, but expressed chagrin that he
was finding himself compelled to charge higher rates on his front-hauls than on his (thinner) back-
hauls; it struck him as unfair. I attempted to reassure him.
53. 282 U.S. 133 (1930). See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
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telephone service, and that how these costs are distributed among them
should depend upon their respective responsibilities for the system's incur-
ring these costs.
Access costs are incurred when the subscriber subscribes, not to inter-
state service, not to intrastate service, not to local service, but to the availa-
bility of any and all of these.54 Therefore, to interpret Smith v. Illinois
Bell as holding that because the subscriber uses the facility for both inter-
state and intrastate calling, much or little, the cost must be levied on that
use rather than on the act of connection that causes the costs to be in-
curred, would be to elevate legal fiction above economic reality. Or per-
haps the following version of the same reality might be easier for the
courts to accept, because it avoids direct confrontation with Smith v. Illi-
nois Bell's assumption that fairness requires users to share the common
costs of the facilities that make that use possible:55 Subscribers use tele-
phone facilities in a number of ways; they use certain facilities when they
ask merely to be hooked up; they use others when they pick up the phone
and dial a local call; they use others when they make interexchange calls;
they use others when they receive calls. I have difficulty believing that
Illinois Bell would have to be interpreted, in 1984, as inconsistent with a
system of charges that differentiates these various usages and charges each
with the costs that it imposes on society-and only with those costs.
The answer, in short, is to teach the courts elementary marginalism,
but-a mild tactical suggestion-without using that word.
Third, in driving home this lesson, in and out of the courts, it is impor-
tant to point out that we are talking not about additional revenue require-
ments but only about rate structure reform-not charging consumers more
but redistributing the burden among them.
Indeed, fourth, we should never pass up an opportunity to point out
that a closer conformance of rate structures with costs will reduce
bills-except as people choose voluntarily to take more service when rates
are reduced. Cost-based pricing is a powerful way of reducing the costs
generated by the present system of subsidization. 6 The more services for
which one charges less than marginal cost, the more uneconomic use one
encourages and the heavier the consequent burden on all subscribers.
Fifth, we must emphasize and reemphasize the inequity of mindless,
unfocused subsidizations. These last two points are well illustrated by re-
cent experience with charges for directory assistance. Upon introducing
54. The costs of connection are the same regardless of the subscriber's subsequent use of any or
all of these services.
55. 282 U.S. at 150-51.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 8-19.
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such charges, the New York Public Service Commission was attacked by
every demagogue in the state on the ground that it was letting the phone
company charge people for something that was previously free. 57 (I have
no doubt this experience was repeated elsewhere.) The Commission
wisely introduced the new charging system when no rate increase was
pending, so that the new system incorporated a charge and a rebate.
When the Commission was able to point out, after two months experi-
ence, that directory assistance calling went down forty-five percent and
that eighty-five percent of the subscribers in the state received the full
rebate-from which it appeared the eighty-five percent had previously
been subsidizing the other fifteen-the opposition disappeared. 8
In the same way, we must remember that the smaller number of other
phones a rural subscriber can reach is itself no reason for lower rural than
urban rates, when the difference is unjustified on grounds of relative costs,
and that the greater purported virtues of rural life are no reason for in-
habitants of center cities further to subsidize it in their telephone bills.
Similarly, the enormous disparity between intrastate toll rates and the
charges for mileage bands within an extended service area should be
openly challenged, on grounds of fairness as well as economic efficiency.
Sixth, telephone companies and their regulators must resist pressures to
upgrade service without charging the affected customers the full costs. It
should surely be possible to show rural subscribers the cost of going from
four- to one-party service, or to show metropolitan area subscribers the
cost of giving them extended area service, and enlist public support for not
doing so unless they are willing to pay those costs. An informed public,
one would hope, is unlikely to regard a mere improvement in the quality
of service as a necessity, much less a necessity which people are entitled to
receive at non-compensatory rates.
Seventh, unbundle, unbundle, unbundle. Unbundling promises a large
number of benefits which, if sufficiently publicized, should make it politi-
cally popular. In the present context, its most important benefit is that it
helps pinpoint subsidized service as well as the recipients of the subsidies.
Telephone companies should offer access alone, or low-priced four- or
eight-party service, then make sure its availability is widely publicized. In
that way companies and commissions can honestly claim to be meeting
any reasonable conception of their social responsibility, namely, to ensure
that there is an inexpensive service available for people who are really
poor.
57. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1975, at 27, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1975, at 14, col. 3; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 5, 1975, at 28, col. 5.
58. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1975, at 29, col. 7.
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Unbundling probably should be undertaken even if the direct immedi-
ate benefits are less than the costs. For example, unbundling requires
measured local service, which, to be truly efficient, must also incorporate
time-of-use differentials. There is a serious question whether the direct
cost savings generated by such measurement will in all situations out-
weigh the costs of measurement. Observers like Bridger Mitchell59 have
found that, where electronic switching is readily available, costs and bene-
fits are likely to be comparable. But even where measurement costs exceed
the direct benefits, we probably should start measuring. For if measure-
ment is necessary to move us away from the gross inefficiencies of the
present system, its initial costs are a small price to pay. Besides, measured
service is also fair. Heavier users, who impose heavier costs on the system,
should pay more than light users.
Conclusion
The inefficiencies of present telephone pricing policies-cost averaging,
usage-based access cost recovery, and flat charges for unlimited local call-
ing-maintain an unrealistic, inequitable and inefficient regime in which
certain groups of consumers subsidize others in ways unrelated to rational
social goals. To correct these inefficiencies we must move to cost-based,
unbundled pricing. The arguments against that kind of pricing, particu-
larly concerns about telephone service for the poor and the desire to main-
tain universal service, fail to acknowledge that, in the long run, marginal
cost pricing is both equitable, since it charges people the costs they impose
on society, and efficient, since it decreases total costs and makes it easier to
direct subsidies to those who need them most. While both fairness and
political prudence clearly justify a gradual transition to more efficient
pricing, failure to begin moving promptly and substantially in that direc-
tion will be self-defeating because it will encourage large users to bypass
the local exchange, thus imposing a larger share of fixed costs on the
smaller number of users who remain tied to it.
The shift to more efficient pricing of telephone services is compelled by
our new national policy of deregulation and competition and constitutes
one of its major benefits. True, competition poses both practical and
political problems. Its beauty, however, is that it forces us to comply with
the dictates of economic reality; its consolation is that to the extent we do,
there will be improved welfare for most of us and efficient ways of taking
care of those who fall behind and genuinely deserve help.
59. Mitchell, Optimal Pricing of Local Telephone Service, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 517 (1978).

